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1955] REcENT DECISIONS 1003 
LAnoR LAw-LMRA-STOCK PURCHASE PLAN As SUBJECT oF CoMPULSORY 
CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING-An employer unilaterally instituted a stock purchase 
plan, membership in which was voluntary and open to regular employees who 
had at least one year of service and were at least thirty years of age. Members, 
through authorized payroll deductions, were to contribute monthly not less than 
five dollars but not more than five percent of their earnings. The employer con-
tributed monthly an amount equal to fifty percent of each member contribution 
and annually an amount dependent upon the ratio of profits to invested capital, 
up to a combined total of seventy-five percent of the members' contributions. 
Member contributions were kept in individual member accounts and employer 
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contributions in individual trusteed accounts. A trustee was to use both ac-
counts to purchase shares of stock of the employer privately or in the open 
market and to credit purchases to the respective accounts. Stock was to be 
distributed to a member at age fifty-five if a man or fifty if a woman, or in 
event of total disability or death, to the member or his beneficiary respectively. 
Nothing was to be distributed to anyone while a member of the plan, but if a 
member left the company's employ before reaching the required age he received 
all his member account and a specified percent of his trusteed account, the 
amount depending upon the length of time he had participated. One week 
after the announcement of the plan, the certified union requested the employer 
to bargain concerning it, but the employer refused, contending that the plan was 
not subject to compulsory collective bargaining. Held., the plan concerns 
"wages" and "conditions of employment" within the meaning of section 8 (d)1 
of the amended National Labor Relations Act, and therefore the employer 
violated sections 8 (a) (5)2 and 8 (a) (1)8 of the act in refusing to bargain. 
The Board expressly refrained from deciding whether the unilateral promulga-
- tion of the plan per se was a violation of the act.4 Rich-field. Oil Co.~ (N.L.R.B. 
1954) CCH Lab. Cas. ,52,345. 
Although cases involving extensive construction of the phrase "wages, hours 
and other terms and conditions of employment" have been relatively few, a re-
cent increase in union pressure to expand the traditional area of collective bar-
gaining has made the issue more acute.5 In the absence of more precise direc-
tions from Congress,6 the Board, with judicial approval, has held in several re-
cent cases that the exercise of an allegedly exclusive management function di-
1 ". • • to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the 
employer and the representative of the employees to • • • confer in good faith with respect 
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. • • ." Labor-Management 
Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 142, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §157. 
2 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collec-
tively •••• " 61 Stat. L. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158. 
8 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with .•• employees 
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157," e.g., the right to bargain collec-
tively. 61 Stat. L. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158. 
4 The NLRB and the courts have generally held that §8(a)(5) precludes the employer 
from unilaterally increasing or decreasing wages, or making other changes in working 
conditions without first consulting the union. See Weyand, "Majority Rule in Collective 
Bargaining," 45 CoL. L. Rav. 556 at 579 (1945). Compare TELLER, MANAGEMENT 
FUNCTIONS UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 92-93 (1947), where the test of legality is 
said to be whether such action has an anti-union effect or purpose. 
6 During World War II the War Labor Board was often confronted with this problem 
but failed to lay down any guiding, consistent principles. For a discussion of its handling 
of such cases, see TELLER, MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS UNDER CoLLECTIVB BARGAINING 
29-34 (1947). 
6 Jn amending the NLRA in 1947, Congress considered delimiting more precisely the 
area of compulsory collective bargaining, but failed to do so. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 
1st sess. (1947). 
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rectly involving or "materially affecting"7 wages, etc. is subject to compulsory 
collective bargaining. 8 The term "wages" has been held to include any direct 
economic benefit accruing to employees as a result of their employment relation-
ship, 9 and the term "conditions of employment" is deemed to include even non-
compulsory10 terms and conditions under which employment is afforded.11 
Looking to substance rather than form, the Board in the principal case felt that 
the plan involved was clearly encompassed within these prior definitions. In 
so holding, it rejected the employer's contention that the purpose of the plan 
was primarily to provide employees an incentive to invest in the company 
rather than to compensate them for services. More significantly perhaps, the 
Board also rejected the contention, skillfully supported by the United States 
Chamber of Commerce in an amicus curiae brief, that the act as a whole, and 
specifically its declaration of policy,12 ~ndicates that certain aspects of the em-
ployment relationship otherwise included in the broad terms "wages" and "con-
ditions of employment" are nonetheless exempt from compulsory collective bar-
gaining when their inclusion would seriously interfere with the "essential rights" 
of either party. It was urged that management's right to control the disposition 
of its property was such an "essential right." In rejecting this argument, the 
Board pointed out that the wording of the act admits of no exceptions. Further-
more, even assuming the policy argument to have merit, any effect upon manage-
ment "rights" was incidental only,13 since the union had the right to represent 
the employees only as employees, not as stockholders, and since the company's 
financial policies were no more relevant to bargaining over this particular plan 
than over regular wages. 
Perhaps the result reached in the principal case is not a significant extension 
of prior decisions, but it does suggest more difficult cases, e.g., one involving a 
plan under which the employer simply sells stock to his employees outright but 
at a discount.14 The generality of the definitions employed by the Board would 
7 NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., (4th Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 821. Note 
that in using the standard "materially affects" the court would seem to be recognizing some 
limitation upon the statutory terms. 
s E.g., Inland Steel v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 247 (pension plan); 
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949) (optional meals furnished by em-
ployer). It should be noted that where there is a granting of an "economic benefit," a 
stronger case for compulsory collective bargaining exists, as both "wages" and "conditions 
of employment" are concerned. However, the exercise of other management functions, 
e.g., selection of supervisors, may in some instances "materially affect" working conditions. 
See Continental Can Co., l Lab. Arb. Rep. 65 (1945). 
9 See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, note 8 supra. 
l0Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., note 8 supra. 
11 See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, note 8 supra. 
12 "It is the • • • policy of this Act • • • to prescribe the legitimate rights of both 
employees and employers • . • to provide • • • procedures for preventing the interference 
by either with the legitimate rights of the other •••• " 61 Stat. L. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
(1952) §141. 
13 Query, however, whether this conclusion would be reached if the union sought to 
compel bargaining over such a plan absent employer initiation of it. 
14 In United Shoe Machinery Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1309 (1951), the employer was 
required to bargain c!oncerning bonuses in the form of grants of stock. 
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include such a plan within the area of compulsory collective bargaining; yet the 
obvious differences in such a plan increase the relevance of the "essential rights" 
theory. Since the appeal of this theory rests fundamentally upon economic:15 
and not legal considerations, however, its ultimate acceptance or rejection would 
seem to require a basic policy determination by Congress. 
Bl.ward W. Powers 
15 One non-legal objection is that complicated benefit plans require too much planning 
and stability to be adaptable to the collective bargaining process. 
